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Abstract 
Following the ECJ’s recent case law on EC freedom of establishment (the 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases), regulatory competition for corporate 
law within the European Union takes place at an early stage of the incorporation 
of new companies. In contrast, as regards the ‘moving out’ of companies from the 
country of incorporation, the ECJ once considered a tax law restriction against 
the transfer abroad of a company’s administrative seat as compatible with EC 
freedom of establishment (the Daily Mail case). For years, this decision has been 
regarded as applicable to all restrictions imposed by countries of incorporation, 
even the forced liquidation of the ‘emigrating’ company. This paper addresses the 
question whether EC freedom of establishment really allows Member States to 
place any limit on the ‘emigration’ of nationally registered companies. It argues 
that EC freedom of establishment covers the transfer of the administrative seat as 
well as the transfer of the registered office and, therefore, that the country of 
incorporation cannot liquidate ‘emigrating’ companies. In addition, it addresses 
the question whether a new Directive is needed to allow the transfer of a com-
pany’s registered office and the identity-preserving company law changes. It 
argues that such a Directive is necessary to avoid legal uncertainty and to protect 
the interests of employees, creditors and minority shareholders, among others, 
who could be detrimentally affected by the ‘emigration’ of national companies. 
 
Keywords: EC freedom of establishment, private international law, regulatory 
competition, transfer of the registered office, limits imposed by countries of 
incorporation. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The well-known decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)1 that broadened 
the possible use of EC freedom of establishment by companies incorporated in an 
—————————————————— 
1 ECJ, Case 79/85 D.H.M. Segers v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en 
Verzekeringswezen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen [1986] ECR 2375 (hereinafter, Segers); 
ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459 
(hereinafter, Centros); ECJ, Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919 (hereinafter, Überseering); ECJ, Case C-167/01 
Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR I-10155 
(hereinafter, Inspire Art); ECJ, Case C-411/03 SEVIC System AG [2005] ECR I-10805 
(hereinafter, Sevic). 
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EU Member State in recent years only addressed the original divergence between 
the registered office and the administrative seat and the limits placed by the 
country of arrival on the ‘inbound’ transfer of the administrative seat of a foreign 
company. In contrast, in the Daily Mail case, the ECJ appears to allow Member 
States to place any limit on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat or the 
registered office of nationally registered companies and, as a consequence, on 
identity-preserving company law changes.2 In other words, European companies 
can apparently freely decide where to incorporate but are not free to change 
company law afterwards by deciding to reincorporate elsewhere. 
 Regarding the question whether the country of incorporation can place limits 
on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office, Member 
States follow different approaches and seem to be walking along random paths. A 
comparative analysis reveals that three solutions are provided by Member States: 
(1) the company is liquidated; (2) the decision to reincorporate abroad is ineffec-
tive: the new company is regarded as incorporated in the country of arrival, but 
the company law of the previous country of incorporation continues to apply; (3) 
the identity-preserving company law change is admitted, provided that the 
substantive and conflict rules of both the country of departure and the country of 
arrival are respected. 
 Surprisingly, these solutions do not run along the boundaries between the ‘real 
seat theory’ and the ‘incorporation theory’: even countries following the latter 
theory are restrictive in the face of company ‘emigration’, as will be made clear in 
the following pages. The reason for the reluctance to allow nationally registered 
companies to reincorporate abroad is that this decision threatens to jeopardise a 
number of constituencies, such as creditors, workers and suppliers, who may be 
affected by the change of jurisdiction, although they are not part of the company 
and hence not involved in the decision to reincorporate abroad, which is usually 
in the hands of the general meeting of shareholders.3 Indeed, a change of the 
applicable company law means a shift in the set of rules that should be applied to 
the internal organisation of the company and to its relations with the outside 
world. For example, if identity-preserving company law changes were allowed, 
an Italian società per azioni transferring its registered office to France would 
become a French société anonyme.4 The company’s articles of association should 
be eventually changed in order to comply with French mandatory rules on the 
—————————————————— 
2 ECJ, Case 81/87 The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex 
parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc [1998] ECR 5483 (hereinafter, Daily Mail.). 
3 See S. Rammeloo, Corporations in Private International Law: A European Perspective 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) p. 4 et seq. 
4 Indeed, a French société anonyme is a company ‘type’ that can be considered analogous 
to the Italian società per azioni. Of course, an Italian company can decide to become a different 
‘type’ of company under the new applicable law, but national company law should require that 
this is made the object of an express decision. 
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société anonyme,5 but the most significant consequence is that French rules and 
principles must be followed even if the articles of association were not formally 
changed. In other words, identity-preserving company law changes are similar to 
a conversion of the original company into a new legal form, but, in contrast to a 
‘national conversion’, the company does not merely change its form but also the 
legal system that regulates its life and activities.6 
 This scenario may change in the near future, as a Hungarian court has submit-
ted to the ECJ a request for a preliminary ruling, asking whether EC freedom of 
establishment also covers the transfer of the registered office and whether the 
country of departure can place limits on this kind of transfer.7 It is worth recalling 
that a few years ago the ECJ rejected, for procedural reasons, a request for a 
preliminary ruling submitted by the District Court of Heidelberg concerning the 
transfer to Spain of both the administrative seat and the registered office of a 
German company.8 The ECJ cannot avoid addressing this issue any longer. 
 The answer will be relevant to the issue at hand, as it will affect any possible 
mechanism for competition between legal systems as regards company law. 
—————————————————— 
5 Under the new applicable company law, the question arises whether any amendment to 
the memorandum of associations is compatible with mandatory substantive law of the country 
of incorporation. 
6 The conversion of a company incorporated in a given jurisdiction into a new company 
regulated by a different law (hereinafter, ‘international conversion’) raises issues that prima 
facie are similar to the ones raised by ‘national transformations’. In both cases, minority 
shareholders need to be protected against decisions of the majority that could fraudulently harm 
them, and creditors risk being damaged if the capital requirements or creditor protection under 
the new law are poorer than in the original jurisdiction. See P. Behrens, ‘Identitätswahrende 
Sitzverlegung einer Kapitalgesellschaft von Luxemburg in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, 
Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) (1986) p. 590; P. Behrens, ‘Die Umstrukturierung 
von Unternehmen durch Sitzverlegung oder Fusion über die Grenze im Lichte der Niederlas-
sungsfreiheit im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Art. 52 und 58 EWGV)’, Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) (1994) p. 9 et seq.; B. Großfeld and Th. König, 
‘Identitätswahrende Sitzverlegung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, Praxis des internation-
alen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht (IPrax) (1991) p. 381 (distinguishing cases of true 
conversion, in which the company changes the lex societatis, from cases of mere adaptation of 
the articles of association); G.A. Frowein, Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung von Kapitalge-
sellschaften (Frankfurt am Main, Lang 2001) p. 139 et seq. 
Nonetheless, it seems to me that the application of the national rules for national conver-
sions might not be sufficient to protect the aforementioned interests, as in our case the company 
changes its legal system and environment, not just the company ‘type’ within the same legal 
system. See M.M. Siems, ‘Sevic: Der letze Mosaikstein im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht 
der EU?’, 17 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) (2006) p. 140. 
7 ECJ, Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató Betti Társaság, Reference for a pre-
liminary ruling from the Szegedi Ítélőtábla (Court of Appeal of Szeged), OJ 2006 C 165/7 
(hereinafter, Cartesio). 
8 LG Heidelberg, 3 March 2000, EuZW (2000) p. 414 and ECJ, Case C-86/00 HSB-
Wohnbau GmbH [2001] ECR I-5353. See P. Behrens ‘Reactions of Member State Courts to the 
Centros ruling by the ECJ’, 2 EBOR (2001) p. 169 et seq. 
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Among US and European scholars, it is fiercely debated whether and to what 
extent competition between legal systems has positive effects.9 In this context, the 
following empirical observation is relevant: recent studies show that European 
firms have widely used the possibility opened up by the ECJ’s case law to freely 
choose the country of incorporation while placing the company’s administrative 
seat in another country.10 Thus, a demand for a broader freedom of establishment 
has emerged among firms, and we can argue that this demand would probably 
extend to identity-preserving company law changes if they were allowed. 
 Regulatory competition has a supply side and a demand side, just like as any 
other market. On the supply side, national jurisdictions should compete amongst 
themselves to attract firms and taxpayers. In order to achieve this goal, we can 
assume that Member States aim to adopt the best possible company laws and to 
offer these laws to companies and potential shareholders. On the demand side, 
firms and potential shareholders seek the most suitable company law offered by 
national jurisdictions. The question arises whether companies or potential 
shareholders are allowed both to choose the most suitable company law at the 
moment of incorporation and to change the applicable company law afterwards 
without needing to liquidate the company in the original country and incorporat-
ing a new one in the country of arrival.11 However, the outcome of this 
competition also depends on the rules governing the internal decision to reincor-
porate. If the board has the competence to decide in favour of reincorporation or 
the power to a veto the shareholders’ decision to reincorporate abroad, the 
company will move to a jurisdiction that maximises the board’s interests, even at 
the expense of the shareholders.12 In addition, a key incentive to emigrate is 
obviously the opportunity to gain from switching to a more advantageous fiscal 
—————————————————— 
9 See M. Gelter ‘The structure of regulatory competition in European corporate law’, 5 J. 
Corp. L. Stud. (2005) p. 249 et seq. 
10  M. Becht, C. Mayer and H. Wagner, Corporate Mobility and the Costs of Regulation, 
ECGI Law Working Paper No. 70 (May 2006). 
11  See K.E. Sørensen and M. Neville, ‘Corporate migration in the European Union: an 
analysis of the proposed 14th EC company law directive on the transfer of the registered office 
of a company from one Member State to another with a change of applicable law’, 6 Col. J. 
Eur. Law (2000) p. 191; C. Kirchner, ‘Zur Ökonomik des legislatorischen Wettbewerbs im 
europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht’, in A. Fuchs, H.-P. Schwintowski and D. Zimmer, eds., 
Festschrift Immenga (Munich, 2004) p. 607 et seq.; L. Enriques, ‘Silence is Golden: The 
European Company as a Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage’, J. Corp. Law Stud. (2004) p. 
82; J.C. Dammann, ‘Freedom of choice in European corporate law’, 29 Yale J. Intl. Law (2004) 
p. 507 et seq.; Gelter, supra n. 9, at p. 265 et seq.; C. Kirchner, R.W. Painter and W.A. Kaal, 
‘Regulatory competition in EU corporate law after Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s product 
for Europe’, ECFR (2005) p. 160 et seq. 
12  See L.A. Bebchuk and A. Hamdani, ‘Vigorous race or leisurely walk: reconsidering the 
competition over corporate charters’ 112 Yale Law Journal (2002) p. 553 et seq.; L.A. 
Bebchuk, ‘The case for increasing shareholders power’, 188 Harvard Law Review (2005) p. 
833 et seq. 
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regime, but we should also consider that tax conflict law is generally based on 
mandatory and objective connecting factors that are independent from the 
applicable company law.13 
 This paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I will describe the legal 
issues arising from the application of EC freedom of establishment to companies. 
The third section addresses the ECJ’s case law relating to EC freedom of estab-
lishment. It will show that, despite Daily Mail, other decisions of the ECJ do not 
distinguish between the ‘moving out’ and ‘moving in’ of a company.14 The fourth 
section addresses the application of conflict and substantive rules to the transfer 
abroad of the administrative and/or registered office. I will analyse what role is 
played by conflict law and substantive company law in relation to a transfer of the 
registered office and/or administrative seat. Conflict law provides an answers to 
the question whether or not this transfer shifts the applicable company law. 
Substantive company law, on the other hand, establishes whether the decision to 
transfer the administrative seat and/or registered office abroad is allowed and 
whether these decisions produce a liquidation of the company. The fifth section 
addresses the question whether EC freedom of establishment covers the limits 
imposed by the country of incorporation on the transfer abroad of the administra-
tive seat and/or registered office. Despite the common interpretation of Daily 
Mail, I will argue that EU companies already enjoy EC freedom of establishment 
vis-à-vis the country of incorporation, which cannot liquidate them. I will then 
discuss the question whether EC freedom of establishment also covers voluntary 
company law changes. 
 
 
2. THE LEGAL ISSUES: A FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Possible outcomes of company ‘emigrations’ 
 
It is useful to present in clear words all possible outcomes of the transfer abroad 
of a company’s administrative seat and/or registered office: 
 
(a)  Identity-preserving company law change: After the transfer of the adminis-
trative seat and/or registered office, the company law of the country of 
arrival applies. The company retains its legal identity and is not regarded as 
—————————————————— 
13  M. Siems, ‘Convergence, competition, Centros and conflicts of law: European company 
law in the 21st Century’, 27 Eur. Law. Rev. (2002) p. 53; G. Burwitz, ‘Tax Consequences of 
the Migration of Companies: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, 7 EBOR (2006) p. 592. 
14  ECJ, Case C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des 
Finances et de l’Industrie [2004] ECR I-2409 (hereinafter, De Lasteyrie); ECJ, Case C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837 
(hereinafter, Marks & Spencer). 
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having been wound up. This means that all assets, liabilities and contractual 
relations remain unaffected. 
(b)  Continuity of the legal identity without change of the applicable company 
law: After the transfer of the administrative seat and/or registered office, the 
company is not regarded as having been wound up, but the applicable com-
pany law does not change. 
(c)  Winding-up of the company: After the transfer of the administrative seat 
and/or registered office, the company is wound up, its assets are taxed as in 
the case of a liquidation and all contractual relations (such as those with sup-
pliers or workers) are interrupted. 
(d)  The decision to transfer the seat abroad is ineffective: Despite the transfer 
abroad, the administrative seat and/or registered office are regarded as still 
being in the country of incorporation, and the original company law should 
be still applied. 
 
2.2 National conflict and substantive law 
 
In order to establish which of the aforementioned effects is produced by a transfer 
of the administrative seat and/or registered office, we should apply the conflict 
and substantive law of both the country of arrival and the country of departure. 
Regarding the different role played by conflict and substantive rules, it is useful to 
put in clear words the basic assumption of the present paper. We should then 
distinguish between two questions: (1) on the one hand, whether the company that 
transfers abroad its administrative seat and/or registered office is regarded as 
having been wound up by the country of departure; and (2) on the other hand, 
whether the transfer of the administrative seat and/or registered office leads to a 
change of the applicable company law. 
 The question whether and under what conditions the applicable law changes is 
essentially answered by conflict rules.15 These rules are aimed at determining the 
applicable substantive law (i.e., lex societatis) according to specific connecting 
factors that refer to the law of a given country. Therefore, the applicable company 
law changes only if the company transfers the connecting factor according to the 
conflict rules of both the country of departure and the country of arrival. For 
instance, if the connecting factor applied by conflict law of both countries is the 
—————————————————— 
15  L. Raape, Internationales Privatrecht (Berlin, Vahlen 1961) p. 203; Behrens (1986), 
supra n. 6, at p. 590; B. Knobbe-Keuk, ‘Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa’, 154 Zeitschrift 
für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) (1990) p. 338; K. Schmidt, 
‘Sitzverlegungsrichtlinie, Freizügigkeit und Gesellschaftsrechtspraxis’, 28 ZGR (1999) p. 22; 
F.J. Garcimartìn Alférez, ‘El traslado del domicilio social al extranjero. Una vision facilita-
dora’, Rev. Soc. (2001) p. 112; W.-H. Roth, ‘From Centros to Überseering: free movement of 
companies, private international law, and community law’, Int. Comp. Law Quarterly (2003) p. 
184; W.-H. Roth, ‘Das Wandern ist des Müllers Lust…: Zur Auswanderungsfreiheit für 
Gesellschaften in Europa’, in S. Lorenz, ed., Festschrift Heldrich (Munich, Beck 2005) p. 979. 
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registered office, the transfer of the latter leads to the application of the company 
law of the country of arrival. 
 In contrast, the continuity of the legal identity is determined by substantive 
law no matter what conflict rules are applied. Companies retain their legal 
identity only if the substantive laws of both the country of arrival and the country 
of departure agree upon this.16 The reason is that substantive law – not conflict 
law – is aimed at determining the prerequisites for the existence of legal persons, 
that is to say, the circumstances under which a group of persons is regarded by the 
law as a separated and independent legal subject that can be imbued with rights 
and duties vis-à-vis the outside world. 
 
2.3 EC law 
 
From the viewpoint of EC freedom of establishment, two questions arise after the 
administrative seat and/or registered office is transferred abroad. 
 On the one hand, we should ask whether any limit imposed by the conflict or 
substantive laws of the Member States on the emigration of own companies is 
compatible with EC freedom of establishment. This question is related to the 
objective effects of the application of national conflict and substantive laws, 
irrespective of whether or not shareholders really want to change company law. 
 On the other hand, we should ask whether EC freedom of establishment 
awards companies the right vis-à-vis the Member State of incorporation to change 
the applicable company law without the need to liquidate and reincorporate in the 
country of arrival. This question concerns the voluntary change of company law. 
If the answer is positive, this would mean that Member States should provide own 
companies with a legal procedure aimed at changing the applicable company law 
without being liquidated. 
 
 
3. DEVELOPMENTS IN EC LAW 
 
3.1 EC freedom of establishment and EC derivative law 
 
Regarding the question whether EC freedom of establishment also covers 
identity-preserving company law changes, it should be recalled that pursuant to 
—————————————————— 
16  See the authors quoted in the previous footnote and also G. Beitzke, ‘Anerkennung und 
Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften und juristische Personen in EWG-Bereich’, 127 ZHR (1965) 
p. 30; B. Großfeld, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht, J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum 
BGB (Berlin, Sellier-de-Gruyter 1998) comment 606; P.St.J. Smart, ‘Corporate domicile and 
multiple incorporation in English Private International Law’, Journal Business Law (1990) p. 
134; P. Kindler Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, in H.J. Sonnenberger, ed., 
Münchener Kommentar BGB, Vol. 11 (Munich, Beck 2006) comment 540. 
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Article 293 EC, Member States should enter into negotiations to secure mutual 
recognition of companies and ‘the retention of legal personality in the event of 
transfer of their seat from one country to another’. As is well known, the Brussels 
Convention of 1968,17 which should have allowed identity-preserving company 
law changes, never entered into force because the Netherlands refused to sign it. 
Nonetheless, pursuant to the ECJ’s case law, it is nowadays accepted that Article 
293 EC does not attribute to Member States any exclusive competence in these 
matters and, therefore, that it does not place any obstacle in the way of the direct 
application of EC freedom of establishment, as entry into negotiations is required 
only in ‘so far as necessary’.18 
 However, derivative community law appears to be moving towards the 
acceptance of freedom to transfer abroad the registered office and to make 
identity-preserving company law changes. 
 First of all, it should be pointed out that two specific legal entities, whose 
existence is based upon EC regulations, are already allowed to voluntarily change 
the applicable law without losing their legal identity. 
 The first of these entities is the European Economic Interest Grouping 
(EEIG),19 which is governed by the law of the country where the ‘official address’ 
is located.20 The latter should be located in the Member State where the EEIG or 
one of its members has its central administration and where the activities of the 
EEIG are carried on.21 The applicable law can be changed without liquidation if 
the EEIG transfers the official address together with the central administration. 
 The second of these entities is the European Company or Societas Europaea 
(SE),22 which for our purposes is more relevant due to its similarity to national 
public companies. Indeed, the SE is partially regulated by the law of the public 
company (such as the Aktiengesellschaft in Germany, the société anonyme in 
France or the società per azioni in Italy) of the Member State where the registered 
office is located, provided that the administrative seat is located in the same 
country.23 In addition, the SE Regulation allows identity-preserving company law 
—————————————————— 
17  Brussels Convention, 29 February 1968, OJ 1972 L 299/32. 
18  Überseering, supra n. 1, recital 52 et seq. See M. Lutter, ‘Überseering und die Folgen’, 
58 Betriebsberater (BB) (2003) p. 8; E. Vaccaro, ‘Transfer of seat and freedom of establish-
ment in European company law’, 16 EBLR (2005) p. 1352; W.-G. Ringe, ‘No freedom of 
emigration for companies?’, 16 EBLR (2005) p. 633. 
19  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2137/1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping. 
20  Ibid., at Art. 2. 
21  Ibid., at Art. 12. 
22  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
Company (SE), OJ 2001 L 294/1-21 (hereinafter, the SE Regulation). 
23  SE Regulation, Art. 7. This rule is a pillar in the structure of the Regulation, since the 
ultimate consequence of a divergence between head office and registered office is the liquida-
tion of the company (SE Regulation, Art. 64(2)).
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changes,24 provided that the SE simultaneously transfers the registered office and 
the administrative seat to another country.25 
 The most significant step towards freedom of ‘emigration’ is the approval of 
the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, which bans any obstacle imposed by the 
country of incorporation of a merging company and provides a framework 
regulation for the proceedings and timing of the merger.26 Similarly to what 
happens in the United States, European limited liability companies now have a 
legal means whereby they can transfer their registered office and change company 
law without needing to be liquidated in the country of origin and reincorporated 
in the country of arrival, as they can incorporate a new company in a different 
Member State and merge with it afterwards.27 
 Despite this development, the approval of a directive on identity-preserving 
company law changes has faced a fierce resistance. The first attempt in 1997 to 
produce a directive on this topic was abandoned,28 and the Commission has since 
launched a public consultation relating to a new proposal regarding the sole 
transfer of the registered office.29 Meanwhile, in its report from 2002,30 the High 
Level Group of Company Law Experts recommended the urgent adoption of a 
directive on the transfer of the registered office and on identity-preserving 
company law changes. The Commission responded to this suggestion with its 
—————————————————— 
24  The SE is therefore a suitable vehicle for overcoming Member States’ resistance to 
identity-preserving company law changes. See Enriques, supra n. 11, at p. 84 et seq. 
25  SE Regulation, Art. 8(1). It is worth mentioning that the wording used to indicate the 
‘registered office’ of an SE is not identical throughout the European Union. For instance, where 
the English wording of the SE Regulation refers to the ‘registered office’, the Italian wording 
refers to the ‘sede sociale’ (i.e., the statutory seat), the French to the ‘siege sociale’ and the 
German, generically, to the ‘Sitz’ (seat) of the SE. On this issue, see Ch. Teichmann, ‘Die 
Einführung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft’, 31 ZGR (2002) p. 455 et seq.; E. Wy-
meersch, ‘Cross-Border Transfer of the Seat of a Company’, in J. Rickford, ed., The European 
Company (Antwerp, Intersentia 2003) p. 90 et seq. 
26  Directive 2005/56/CE of the Parliament and the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-
border mergers of limited liability companies OJ 2005 L 310/1 (hereinafter, the Directive on 
Cross-Border Mergers). See M.M. Siems, ‘The European directive on cross-border mergers: an 
international model?’, 11 Col. J. Eur. Law (2005) p. 167 et seq. 
  While Sevic is based on the freedom of establishment stemming from the EC Treaty and 
should therefore be applied to all companies, the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers addresses 
only limited liability companies. 
27  See Gelter, supra n. 9, at p. 267; Siems, supra n. 26, at p. 179. 
28  This first draft of a Fourteenth Directive on company law harmonisation is available at: 
<http://www.uv.es/cde/TEXTOS/14thCLDd.pdf>. On the first draft, see R. Drury, ‘Migrating 
Companies’, 24 Eur. Law Rev. (1999) p. 362 et seq. 
29  See: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/seat-transfer/index_en.htm>. 
30  Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory 
Framework for Company Law in Europe, Brussels, 4 November 2002, p. 101 et seq., available 
at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf>. 
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Action Plan of 2003,31 which regards this issue as one of the priorities in EC 
company law. The future of this project is still uncertain, and the ECJ once again 
has the opportunity to move forward faster than the EC representative organs 
when it decides on the submission of the Cartesio case.32 But even if the ECJ 
were to state that EC freedom of establishment covers identity-preserving 
company law changes, the question nonetheless arises whether there is a need for 
a directive regulating this issue. 
 
3.2 Decisions of the ECJ relating to ‘moving in’ cases 
 
Although the development in the ECJ’s judgments on companies’ freedom of 
establishment has been widely celebrated as the beginning of a widespread 
competition between the Member States’ legal systems to attract the incorporation 
of firms and companies, the reality is far from being so clear. 
 The ECJ has only addressed limits imposed by the country of arrival on 
companies transferring their administrative seat into its territory without changing 
the applicable company law. In fact, these ‘liberal’ ECJ decisions concern only 
two issues: (1) the original divergence between the administrative seat and the 
registered office, as in Centros and Inspire Art, and (2) the transfer of the admin-
istrative seat to another Member State after incorporation without changing 
company law, as in Überseering. 
 Thus, European citizens can incorporate a new company in any Member State, 
even if the company does not operate in the country of incorporation at all, 
provided that the latter accepts an original divergence between the registered 
office and the administrative seat. After incorporation, the administrative seat can 
be transferred to another Member State, which cannot impose unjustified obsta-
cles on this transfer. 
 The ECJ then extended EC freedom of establishment to cross-border merg-
ers.33 In Sevic, it debated whether German case law, which prohibits cross-border 
mergers,34 was compatible with EC law. A Luxembourg company (SVC) had 
—————————————————— 
31  Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on Modernis-
ing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to 
Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final. 
32  See n. 7 above. 
33  Sevic, supra n. 1. 
34  This was the dominant opinion according to German legal scholars and courts, based on 
§ 1(1) of the Umwandlungsgesetz [Act on Transformations of Legal Entities] (hereinafter, 
UmwG), which includes both the conversion of companies into another form and company 
mergers, pursuant to which, the rules set forth by the UmwG should be applied to entities 
having their ‘seat’ in Germany. See H. Schaumburg, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Umwandlungen’, 
87 GmbH Rundschau (GmbHR) (1996) p. 502; Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 699; Kindler, 
supra n. 16, comment 872 et seq. Other scholars, nonetheless, hold that § 1(1) UmwG does not 
place an obstacle on cross-border mergers. See H. Kronke, ‘Deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht und 
grenzüberschreitende Strunkturänderungen’, ZGR (1994) p. 35; H. Kallmeyer, ‘Grenzüber-
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decided to merge with a German company (Sevic), but the German registrar 
refused to inscribe the merger in the register, arguing that German substantive law 
did not permit cross-border mergers even if the resultant company was a German 
one.35 The ECJ declared that the German regime was incompatible with EC 
freedom of establishment, at least as regards ‘inbound’ mergers, that is to say, 
when the merger is prohibited by the Member State where the resulting company 
should be registered. It is not clear whether Sevic can also be applied to limits 
imposed by the original country of the merging companies,36 but this should no 
longer be an issue for limited liability companies since the approval of the 
Directive on Cross-Border Mergers. 
 These ‘liberal’ ECJ decisions thus did not concern the limits imposed on the 
transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office by the country 
of departure. IN summary, we can state that EC freedom of establishment requires 
Member States of arrival to accept that the administrative seat can diverge from 
the place of incorporation. On the supply side, Member States can therefore 
compete to attract companies at an early stage of the decision-making process on 
where to incorporate a new company. At this stage, shareholders can choose the 
country that provides the most suitable company law.37 After incorporation, 
shareholders can change company law only if this is allowed by the conflict law 
of both the country of arrival and the country of departure.38 
—————————————————— 
schreitende Verschmelzungen und Spaltungen’, 17 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) (1996) 
p. 535; T. Kuntz, ‘Zur Möglichkeit grenzüberschreitender Fusionen’, 16 EuZW (2005) p. 526. 
35  See LG Koblenz, 16 September 2003, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 
(2003) p. 1124 et seq. 
36  The first comments on Sevic hold that the rationale of the decision should also be ex-
tended to ‘outbound’ cross-border mergers. See V. Geyrhalter and T. Weber, ‘Transnationale 
Verschmelzungen – im Spannungsfeld zwischen SEVIC Systems und der Verschmelzungs-
richtlinie’, 44 Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) (2006) p. 150; W. Meilicke and D.E. Rabback, 
‘Die EuGH-Entscheidung in der Rechtssache Sevic und die Folgen für das deutsche Umwand-
lungsrecht nach Handels- und Steuerrecht’, 97 GmbHR (2006) p. 125 et seq.; E.-M. Kieninger, 
‘Grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzungen in der EU – das SEVIC-Urteil des EuGH’, EWS 
(2006) p. 51; G.-J. Vossestein, ‘Companies’ Freedom of Establishment after Sevic’, ECR 
(2006) p. 177 et seq.; P. Behrens, ‘Comment to Sevic’, CMLR (2006) p. 1686; M.M. Siems, 
‘SEVIC: Beyond Cross-Border Mergers’, 8 EBOR (2007) p. 307 et seq.; M. Doralt, ‘Cross-
border mergers: A glimpse into the future’, ECFR (2007) p. 25; N. Krause and N. Kulpa, 
‘Grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzungen’, 171 ZHR (2007) p. 45. 
37  See E.-M. Kieninger, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach ‘Centros’, ‘Überseering’ 
und ‘Inspire Art’: Antworten, Zweifel und offene Fragen’, 12 Zeitschrift für europäisches 
Privatrecht (ZEuP) (2004) p. 692; M. Andenas, ‘Freedom of establishment’, Law Quart. Rev. 
(2003) p. 221 et seq.; A. Looijestijn-Clearie, ‘Have the Dikes Collapsed? Inspire Art: A Further 
Breakthrough in the Freedom of Establishment of Companies?’, 5 EBOR (2004) p. 404; U. 
Klinke, ‘European Company Law and the ECJ: The Court’s Judgments in the Years 2001 to 
2004’, ECFR (2004) p. 270 et seq. 
38  A. Johnston, ‘EC freedom of establishment, employee participation in corporate govern-
ance and the limits of regulatory competition’, J. Corp. L. Stud. (2006) p. 875 et seq. 
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3.3 Decisions of the ECJ relating to ‘moving out’ cases 
 
In the well-known Daily Mail case, the ECJ addressed the question whether limits 
placed by the country of departure on the ‘emigration’ of own companies are 
compatible with EC freedom of establishment. In this case, an English company 
decided to transfer abroad its administrative seat and tax domicile (its ‘residence’ 
according to the English legal wording). In order to do this, according to English 
tax law, companies need authorisation from the Treasury, which refused to grant 
authorisation in this case. It was therefore an issue of tax law rather than company 
or conflict law. Nonetheless, the ECJ expressed its opinion by means of a very 
broad statement that is also applicable to conflict law and other limits imposed by 
the country of departure. 
 The ECJ indeed stated that ‘unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of 
the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. 
They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines 
their incorporation and functioning.’39 As regards national conflict rules, the ECJ 
stated that  
 
the Treaty regards the differences in national legislation concerning the re-
quired connecting factor and the question whether the registered office or real 
head office of a company incorporated under national law may be transferred 
from one Member State to another as problems which are not resolved by the 
rules concerning the right of establishment but must be dealt with by future 
legislation or conventions.40  
 
Therefore,  
 
Articles 52 [now 43] and 58 [now 48] of the Treaty cannot be interpreted as 
conferring on companies incorporated under the law of a Member State a right 
to transfer their central management and control and their central administra-
tion to another Member State while retaining their status as companies 
incorporated under the legislation of the first Member State.41 
 
 According to widespread opinion, Daily Mail should be regarded as being 
‘good law’, even following the ECJ’s recent decisions on the transfer of the 
administrative seat, as the ECJ distinguished the matter at issue in Überseering 
and Inspire Art from the issues debated in Daily Mail, which was therefore not 
overruled.42 We should conclude that: (1) the conflict law and company law of 
—————————————————— 
39  Daily Mail, supra n. 2, recital 19. 
40  Ibid., at recital 23. 
41  Ibid., at recital 24. 
42  See Kieninger, supra n. 37, at p. 694; C. Kersting and C.P. Schindler, ‘The ECJ’s Inspire 
Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and Its Effects on Practice’, 4 German Law Journ. (2003) 
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Member States can place limits on the transfer abroad of the administrative seat 
and/or registered office of domestic companies; and (2) EC freedom of establish-
ment does not grant companies a right vis-à-vis their own country to change 
company law voluntarily, irrespective of the conflict rules applied by the Member 
State of incorporation. 
 However, Daily Mail is not as unambiguous as it might appear at a first 
glance. Indeed, in Daily Mail the ECJ also stated:  
 
Even though those provisions [i.e., Articles 43 and 48 TEC] are directed 
mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host 
Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the 
Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member 
State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation 
which comes within the definition contained in Article 58. As the Commission 
rightly observed, the rights guaranteed by Articles 52 et seq. would be ren-
dered meaningless if the Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings 
from leaving in order to establish themselves in another Member State.43 
 
 This statement was probably only an obiter dictum in Daily Mail, nonetheless 
it was used by the ECJ as a ratio decidendi in a decision issued ten years later. In 
this case, a tax relief based on the law of the country of incorporation of a holding 
company, which was applicable only if the main activities of the controlling 
entities were national, was declared as incompatible with EC freedom of estab-
lishment.44 The same argument was applied by the ECJ in the recent Marks & 
Spencer case, where it held that  
 
Even though, according to their wording, the provisions concerning freedom of 
establishment are directed to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are 
treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, 
they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment 
in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated 
under its legislation.45 
 
—————————————————— 
p. 1282; P. Lagarde, Überseering, case note, 92 RCDIP (2003) p. 529; G. Rehm, ‘Völker- und 
europarechtliche Vorgaben für die Bestimmung des Personalstatuts’, in H. Eidenmüller, ed., 
Ausländische Kapitalgesellschaften im deutschen Recht (Munich, Beck 2004) comment 65. 
43  Daily Mail, supra n. 2, recital 16. 
44  ECJ, Case C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer 
(HM Inspector of Taxes) [1998] ECR I-4695, recital 16 (hereinafter, ICI). 
45  Marks & Spencer, supra n. 14, recital 31. See G.-J. Vossestein, ‘Exit Restrictions on 
Freedom of Establishment after Marks & Spencer’, 7 EBOR (2006) p. 863 et seq.; D. Dürr-
schmidt and M. Schiller, ‘Die Rechtssache Marks & Spencer und ihre Folgen’, Europarecht 
(2007) p. 277; P. Rodas, ‘La libertad de establecimiento en la UE tras la Sentencia del TJCE 
Marks & Spencer’, Cuadernos Der. Com. (2007) n. 47. 
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 It is also worth mentioning the case de Lasteyrie, in which a French citizen 
who owned a shareholding in a French company transferred his domicile to 
Belgium. According to French tax law, if a French citizen transfers his or her 
domicile abroad, unrealised capital gains on his or her shareholdings should be 
taxed in order to tackle tax avoidance. The ECJ declared these provisions as 
incompatible with EC freedom of establishment, because ‘the transfer of a 
physical person’s tax residence outside the territory of a Member State does not, 
in itself, imply tax avoidance.’46 This decision was related to the transfer of a 
natural person, hence it is debatable whether it should be regarded as relevant to 
company ‘emigration’.47 
 We can conclude, therefore, that within the ECJ’s case law the distinction 
between ‘moving in’ and ‘moving out’ cases is not as evident and established as it 
appears to be according to widespread opinion among legal scholars concerning 
Daily Mail.48 
 
 
4. NATIONAL CONFLICT AND SUBSTANTIVE RULES 
 
It is worth paying attention to how Member States’ laws address the transfer of a 
company’s administrative seat and/or registered office. In order to clarify this 
issue, the application of conflict law and substantive law will be discussed 
separately. 
—————————————————— 
46  De Lasteyrie, supra n. 14, recital 51. 
47  See the different opinions held, on the one hand, by Rehm, supra n. 42, comment 68; H. 
Eidenmüller and G.M. Rehm, ‘Niederlassungsfreiheit versus Schutz des inländischen Rechts-
verkehrs: Konturen des Europäischen internationalen Gesellschaftsrechts’, 33 ZGR (2004) p. 
178, n. 78; and Ringe, supra n. 18, at p. 640 (De Lasteyrie is irrelevant and does not overrule 
Daily Mail.) and, on the other hand, P. Mankowski, ‘Entwicklungen im IPR und IZVR 
2003/2004’, RIW (2004) p. 484; L. Enriques and M. Gelter, ‘Regulatory Competition in 
European Company Law and Creditor Protection’, 7 EBOR (2006) p. 431; and Gelter, supra n. 
9, at p. 268 (the decision should also be applied to outbound transfers of the administrative seat 
and/or registered office). 
48  See also the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Sevic, recital 45: ‘it is evident from 
this case law that Article 43 EC does not merely prohibit a Member State from impeding or 
restricting the establishment of foreign operators in its territory, it also precludes it from 
hindering the establishment of national operators in another Member State. In other words, 
restrictions ‘on entering’ or ‘on leaving’ national territory are prohibited.’ In Sevic, the ECJ 
upheld the conclusions of the Advocate General but unfortunately neither quoted this sentence 
of the Advocate General nor explicitly admitted that ‘moving out’ cases should be treated like 
‘moving in’ cases. 
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4.1 Conflict law 
 
4.1.1 Conflict law families: ‘incorporation theories’ v. ‘real seat theory’ 
 
Legal scholars distinguish two kinds of conflict rules: those based on ‘real seat 
theory’ and those based on ‘incorporation theory’. 
 I would like to point out that this is only a rough distinction and that legal 
systems that are classified as belonging to the same ‘theory’ might employ 
different practical solutions, as will be made clear in the following pages.49 The 
distinction between two opposite ‘theories’ is deeply rooted in a legal tradition 
that depicts conflict law as formed only by multilateral conflict rules.50 Following 
this assumption, company conflict rules refer to a single law, the ‘personal 
statute’ of the company, which aims to regulate all questions falling within 
‘company law’.51 The same connecting factor, therefore, should establish both 
whether national law is to be applied and under what circumstances a foreign 
company should be recognised. 
 Real legal systems are rather different from this simplified model. National 
conflict laws, for instance, may apply different unilateral conflict rules to own 
companies and foreign companies or may provide for a more complex bundling 
of conflict and substantive rules. Moreover, the outcome also depends on whether 
conflict rules call for the application only of substantive law or also of conflict 
rules (i.e., renvoi doctrine).52 If the conflict law of the country of departure does 
not follow the renvoi doctrine and a company transfers the connecting factor to 
another country, then it should only apply the substantive company law of the 
country of arrival but not its conflict law. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the 
country of departure, the applicable company law changes independently of the 
conflict rules of the country of arrival. In contrast, if the conflict law of the 
country of departure follows the renvoi doctrine, the outcome of the transfer of 
the connecting factor is different, since we should pay attention to the conflict law 
—————————————————— 
49  See J. Wouters, ‘Private International Law and Companies’ Freedom of Establishment’, 
2 EBOR (2001) p. 103 et seq. 
50  On multilateral conflict rules, see L. Collins, et al., eds., Dicey, Morris and Collins on 
the Conflict of Laws, 14th rev. edn., Vol. 1 (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) p. 21. 
51  See H. Halbhuber, ‘National doctrinal structures and European company law’, 38 CMLR 
(2001) p. 1392. 
52  On the renvoi doctrine, see P. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private 
International Law (London, Oxford University Press 2005) p. 51 et seq.; Dicey, Morris and 
Collins, supra n. 50, at p. 65 et seq. (arguing both that the renvoi doctrine should be rejected 
under English conflict law and that only substantive law should be applied); T. Ballarino, 
Diritto internazionale privato (Padova, Cedam 1999) p. 255 et seq.; J. Kropholler, Internation-
ales Privatrecht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2004) p. 161 et seq.; H.J. Sonnenberger, ‘IPR. 
Einleitung’, in H.J. Sonnenberger, ed., Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 4th edn., Vol. 10 
(Munich, Beck 2006) comment 403 et seq. 
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of the country of arrival, as this could clash with the conflict law of the country of 
departure and refer to the law of another country or even refer ‘back’ to the law of 
the country of departure.53 
 Nonetheless, the distinction between ‘real seat theory’ and ‘incorporation 
theory’ is helpful to understanding the functioning of conflict law, but only if we 
make clear that such theories are ‘ideal’ analytical tools rather than a picture of 
the real world.54 Therefore, it is more meaningful to depict the two ‘theories’ as 
two different ‘families’ of conflict laws rather than two identical multilateral 
conflict rules. 
 Bearing this in mind, we can say that, according to the ‘real seat theory’, the 
law of the country where they have their administrative (i.e., ‘real’) seat should be 
applied to companies. The connecting factor, therefore, is objective and manda-
tory, and party autonomy is excluded.55 Many EU Member States belong to this 
family, including Spain, France and Belgium, but its purest version, at least 
before the aforementioned ECJ decisions on EC freedom of establishment, was 
applied in German and Austrian law. 
 In contrast, according to ‘incorporation theory’, the law of the country where 
they are incorporated should be applied to companies. Therefore, the founders of 
a company can freely choose the country where they wish to incorporate and the 
applicable law, notwithstanding that the firms operates in another country. In 
contrast to the common but oversimplified view, there could be different kinds of 
incorporation theories, rather than just one, based on the relevant connecting 
factor.56 For our purposes, the most significant distinction is between conflict 
rules referring to the country of the original incorporation and conflict rules 
referring to the country of any subsequent reincorporation or simply to the 
country where the registered office is located. Many other Member States of the 
—————————————————— 
53  Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 500 et seq. 
54  According to Max Weber’s definition of the ‘empyrischer Idealtypus’, see M. Weber, 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen, Mohr 1922). 
55  See Roth (2003), supra n. 15, at p. 181; W.F. Ebke, ‘The European Conflict-of-
Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, Inspire Art and Beyond’, EBLR (2005) p. 13. 
56  Legal scholars have distinguished between the following connecting factors: (i) the 
country in whose territory the legal formalities for the incorporation were completed; (ii) the 
country according to whose law the company is regulated by shareholders (which could be 
different from the case sub (i) if the company is a mere partnership that does not need any 
formality in order to come into existence); and (iii) the place where the registered office is 
located (which could be different from the country of the original incorporation if the country 
of arrival allows companies to reincorporate in its territory). See J. Hoffmann, ‘Das Anknüp-
fungsmoment der Gründungstheorie’, 101 Zeitschrift für die vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 
(ZvglRW) (2002) p. 293; H. Eidenmüller, ‘Theorien zur Bestimmung des Gesellschaftsstatuts 
und Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte’, in Ausländische Kapitalgesellschaften, supra n. 42, 
comment 3; M.V. Benedettelli, ‘Conflicts of jurisdiction and conflicts of law in company law 
matters within the EU “market for corporate models”: Brussels I and Rome I after Centros’, 
EBLR (2005) p. 56, n. 2. 
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European Union and the EEA belong to the family of incorporation theories, such 
as England, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland. 
 
4.1.2 Conflict law of the country of departure 
 
4.1.2.1 The country of departure follows real seat theory 
 
Theoretically, under real seat theory, the transfer abroad of the administrative seat 
should lead to a change of the applicable company law, provided that the country 
of arrival does not refer back to the country of origin because it follows the renvoi 
doctrine.57 In contrast, the transfer abroad of only the registered office or the 
statutory seat should not be relevant, as this is not a connecting factor,58 but this 
cannot be the case, as the transfer of the registered office abroad makes national 
law unenforceable. In addition, we should also consider that, according to the 
First Company Law Directive,59 the articles of association of limited liability 
companies need to be inscribed on a public register, which plays a crucial role in 
the incorporation and should therefore be located in the country according to 
whose law the company is incorporated.60 This is the reason behind the general 
—————————————————— 
57  More specifically, if the conflict law of the country of incorporation follows the renvoi 
doctrine, the applicable company law changes only if the country of arrival follows ‘real seat 
theory’ as well. In contrast, if the country of arrival follows incorporation theory, its conflict 
law refers back to the country of departure (where the company was originally incorporated) 
and company law should not change, unless the company has also transferred the registered 
office (in the latter case, as will be made clear in the following pages, the outcome depends on 
whether the country of arrival refers to the country of the original incorporation or to the 
country of any subsequent r-incorporation, and whether the substantive law allows company 
reincorporation). 
58  T. Ballarino, ‘La società per azioni nella disciplina internazionalprivatistica’, in G.E. 
Colombo and G.B. Portale, eds., Trattato delle società per azioni, Vol. 9/1 (Torino, Utet 1994) 
p. 108; Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 650; W.-H. Roth, ‘Die Wegzugsfreiheit für Gesell-
schaften’, in M. Lutter, ed., Europäische Auslandsgesellschaften in Deutschland (Cologne, O. 
Schmidt 2005) p. 382; Garcimartìn Alférez, supra n. 15, at p. 110; Kindler, supra n. 16, 
comment 510. 
59  First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States 
of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a 
view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community. 
60  See Roth (2005), supra n. 15, at p. 982; S. Lombardo, ‘Libertà di stabilimento e mobilità 
delle società in Europa’, 21 Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata (2005) p. 372. For 
instance, as regards the incorporation of a new company, according to Italian law concerning 
joint stock companies (incorporation doctrine), the competent register is the one of the place 
where the company has its registered office (Art. 2330 Codice Civile [Civil Code]). According 
to German law (real seat theory), the competent register for the GmbH is the one of the place 
where the company has its registered office (§ 7 GmbHG [the law on private limited compa-
nies]). 
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rule followed by German courts, according to which under real seat theory the 
administrative seat should coincide with the statutory seat and the public register 
on which the company is inscribed.61 This means that companies cannot decide to 
transfer abroad their administrative seat without transferring the registered office 
as well, provided that substantive law allows this transfer without liquidation.62 
 
4.1.2.2 The country of departure follows incorporation theory 
 
As I pointed out above, there are many incorporation theories, depending on the 
relevant connecting factor. For our purposes, it is relevant to distinguish between 
conflict rules referring to the country of the original incorporation and conflict 
rules referring to the country of any subsequent reincorporation. Following a 
transfer of the registered office abroad, the applicable company law changes only 
if the conflict law of the country of departure does not refer to the country of the 
original incorporation but to the country where the company is incorporated and 
registered, even if the registered office is transferred there afterwards. As will be 
made clear in the following pages, the applicable company law cannot be changed 
without the intervention of substantive law, which should allow company 
reincorporation. 
 Common law countries, such as England and Ireland, are restrictive vis-à-vis 
the reincorporation of own companies abroad. The basic principle in common law 
is that companies are regulated by the law of their ‘domicile’, which is the 
country of the original incorporation, where companies should locate their 
registered office.63 Hence, the transfer abroad of the registered office does not 
shift the connecting factor and the applicable law does not change.64 English and 
—————————————————— 
61  Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 400; Garcimartìn Alférez, supra n. 15, at p. 110; Roth, 
supra n. 58, at p. 381. 
62  See S. Lombardo, ‘Conflict of Law Rules in Company Law after Überseering’, 4 EBOR 
(2003) p. 309. 
63  Baelz v. PT [1926] 1 Ch. 683; Gasque v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1940] 2 KB 
80 (hereinafter, Gasque); National Trust Company v. Ebro Irrigation & Power Ltd. [1954] 
DLR 326; International Credit and Investment Co v. Adham [1994] 1 BCLC 66. Among legal 
scholars, see A. Farnsworth, The Residence and Domicile of Corporations (London, Butter-
worths 1939) p. 71; D.D. Prentice, ‘The incorporation theory – The UK’, 14 EBLR (2003) p. 
633; Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra n. 50, Vol. 2, at p. 1336. 
  The incorporation doctrine is also applied also in the United States. See Vantage Point 
Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (2005) (Del. Supr. Ct); S.C. Symeon-
ides, ‘Choice of law in the American courts in 2005: 19th annual survey’, 53 Am J. Comp. L. 
(2006) p. 649 et seq. 
64  Farnsworth, supra n. 63, at p. 222 (arguing that, since the applicable law cannot change, 
the company cannot have a domicile of choice); North and Fawcett, supra n. 52, at p. 175; 
Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra n. 50, at p. 1337. 
Dutch and Danish law is similar to English law, as both also follow the incorporation doc-
trine: the company’s emigration is not allowed and the decision to transfer the registered office 
 Federico M. Mucciarelli EBOR 9 (2008) 286 
Irish substantive law also does not allow the transfer abroad of the registered 
office, based on the consideration that the ‘old’ company is still existent and the 
new company is grounded in the country of arrival.65 Indeed, a seminal decision 
of an English court, stressing the parallel between natural and legal persons, states 
that ‘[t]he domicile of origin, or the domicile of birth, using with respect to a 
company a familiar metaphor, clings to it throughout its existence’.66 
 Other examples of incorporation theory can be found in Italian and Swiss 
conflict law. According to Italian conflict law, companies are regulated by the law 
of the country where the incorporation proceedings were carried out.67 In addition, 
companies can transfer their registered office abroad, but only if this is done in 
accordance with the law of all ‘involved’ countries, that is to say, the country of 
departure and the country of arrival.68 Symmetrically, Italian company law 
explicitly allows companies to transfer their registered office abroad.69 It follows 
from these rules that a transfer made according to Italian company law is hindered 
only if the law of the country of arrival does not consent to it or if the transfer 
itself is not realised in accordance with such law.70 Nonetheless, the transfer 
should not lead to a change of the applicable law, at least not from the viewpoint 
of Italian conflict rules. Italian case law on this point is not homogenous, but it is 
worth mentioning that, a few years ago, the Italian Corte di Cassazione decided to 
liquidate a company exactly because the transfer of its registered office changed 
the applicable company law.71 However, this is an isolated decision in Italian case 
—————————————————— 
abroad is ineffective (but the company is not liquidated). See L. Timmerman, ‘Sitzverlegung 
nach niederländischem Recht’, 28 ZGR (1999) p. 153; Drury, supra n. 28, at p. 358; E. 
Wymeersch, ‘The transfer of the company’s seat in European company law’, 40 CMLR (2003) 
p. 666; Rammeloo, supra n. 3, at p. 124 et seq. 
65  P. Nygh, ‘The refugee corporation’, West. Australian L.R. (1976) p. 468; Smart, supra n. 
16, at p. 126 et seq.; Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra n. 50, at p. 1337. 
66  Gasque, supra n. 63, at p. 84. 
67  Art. 25(1) of the Reform of Private International Law Act No. 218, 31 May 1995 (here-
inafter, ‘Italian Act on Private International Law’). See M.V. Benedettelli, ‘La legge regolatrice 
delle persone giuridiche dopo la riforma del diritto internazionale privato’, 42 Rivista delle 
società (1997) p. 39 et seq. 
68  Art. 25(3) Italian Act on Private International Law. See Benedettelli, supra n. 67, at p. 
96; and M.V. Benedettelli, ‘Libertà comunitarie di circolazione e diritto internazionale private 
delle società’, Rivista italiana diritto internazionale privato (2001) p. 620 (who argues that this 
is not a conflict norm but a private international substantive norm that places some limits on the 
effectiveness of company ‘emigrations’). 
69  Art. 2437 Codice Civile [Civil Code], providing a withdrawal right for dissenting share-
holders. See M. Ventoruzzo, ‘Cross-border mergers, change of the applicable corporate laws and 
protection of dissenting shareholders: withdrawal rights under Italian law’, ECFR (2007) p. 62. 
70  R. Luzzato and C. Azzolini, ‘Società (nazionalità e legge regolatrice)’, Digesto disc. 
priv. sez. commerciale, Vol. 14 (Torino 1997) p. 153; A. Santa Maria, ‘Società. Diritto 
internazionale privato’, in Enciclopedia giuridica Treccani (Roma 1998) p. 4; Ballarino, supra 
n. 52, at p. 371. 
71  Corte di Cassazione Civile, S.U. 23 January 2004, n. 1244, Rivista italiana di diritto 
internazionale privato e processuale (2005) 1381. 
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law. In my view, is not consistent with Italian substantive law, which explicitly 
admits the transfer abroad of the registered office.72 
 In contrast, Swiss international company law follows a more liberal path. 
Pursuant to Swiss private international law, companies are regulated by the law of 
the State under whose law they are organised, which is a wider connecting factor 
than the country of the original incorporation.73 Therefore, Swiss companies can 
change jurisdiction without being wound up if they comply with Swiss substan-
tive and conflict rules and if the country of arrival permits such identity-
preserving inbound reincorporation.74 
 
4.1.3 Conflict law of the country of arrival 
 
4.1.3.1 The country of arrival follows real seat theory 
 
From the viewpoint of a country of arrival following real seat theory, any inbound 
transfer of the administrative seat of a foreign company leads to a change of the 
applicable company law, irrespective of the conflict rules applied by the country 
of departure.75 As I have pointed out above, the registered office should generally 
be located in the country of the applicable law. Hence, the country of arrival should 
require the company also to transfer the registered office and to reincorporate 
—————————————————— 
72  Italian case law appears to be incoherent, and all possible solutions are represented: (a) 
the ‘emigrating’ company is liquidated (App. Torino, 17 June 1958, Rivista di diritto industri-
ale (1958) II, p. 373 et seq.; App. Trieste, 9 October 1999, Rivista del notariato (2000) p. 167 
et seq.); (b) Italian company law continues to be applied, despite the transfer abroad of the 
registered office (App. Milano, 7 May 1974, Giurisprudenza commerciale (1975) II, p. 832 et 
seq.; Trib. Verona, 5 December 1996, Società (1997) p. 574 et seq.); (c) the decision of the 
general meeting to convert the Italian company into a foreign one and transfer the registered 
office abroad is void (Trib. Alessandria, 19 August 1995, and App. Torino, 1 December 1995, 
Nuova giur. civ. commentata (1996) p. 855 et seq.); and (d) identity-preserving company law 
changes are permitted if the law of the country of arrival allows them (Trib. Torino, 10 January 
2007, Giurisprudenza italiana (2007) p. 1679 et seq.). On this topic, see F.M. Mucciarelli, ‘The 
Transfer of the Registered Office and Forum-Shopping in International Insolvency Cases: An 
Important Decision from Italy’, 2 ECFR (2005) p. 512 et seq. 
73  Art. 154 of the Swiss Code on Private International Law of 18 December 1987. If a 
company incorporated abroad is managed from Switzerland, the managers are deemed liable 
(Art. 159 of the Swiss Code on Private International Law). Although Switzerland is not a 
member of the European Union, EC freedom of establishment should also be applied to Swiss 
companies, in accordance with the general agreement between Switzerland and the European 
Community of 23 June 1999. Hence, Art. 159 is probably at odds with Inspire Art. See F. 
Vischer in Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG (Zürich, Schulthess 2005) p. 1786. 
74  Art. 163 of the Swiss Code on Private International Law. 
75  The country of departure and the country of arrival could follow different conflict rules 
and disagree on the applicable law. See Ballarino, supra n. 58, at p. 106; Großfeld, supra n. 16, 
comment 629; T. Ballarino, ‘Sulla mobilità delle società nella Comunità Europea’, 48 Riv. Soc. 
(2003) p. 690; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 499; Garcimartìn Alférez, supra n. 15, at p. 110; 
Roth, supra n. 58, at p. 382 and Roth 2005, supra n. 15, at p. 978. 
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according to its own law.76 This raises the question whether the substantive law of 
the country of arrival allows this kind of ‘inbound’ reincorporation.77 ‘Real seat’ 
countries do not follow identical solutions regarding this issue. 
 For example, according to German case law, German company law should be 
applied to companies transferring their administrative seat to Germany. After the 
‘inbound’ transfer of the administrative seat, the immigrating company should 
therefore be regarded either (i) as non-existent, since it was not incorporated in 
accordance with the ‘right’ law,78 or (ii) as a mere partnership.79 Following the 
aforementioned ECJ decisions on EC freedom of establishment, German case law 
has abandoned the real seat theory towards companies incorporated in EU and 
EEA Member States, stressing that EU companies transferring their administra-
tive seat to another Member State should be recognised if they still have their 
registered office in the country of incorporation.80 Real seat theory should be still 
applied to non-EU and German companies.81 
 In contrast, France, which is commonly also classified among the ‘real seat’ 
countries,82 although this classification is nowadays debated among legal schol-
ars,83 accepts company immigration. The immigrating company should transfer its 
—————————————————— 
76  Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 513. 
77  Ibid., at comment 499. 
78  See BGH, 21 March 1986, BGHZ 97, 269 et seq.; for other case law references, see also 
Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 85; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 400. 
79  OLG Frankfurt M., 4 December 2001, NJW/RR (2002) p. 605 et seq.; BGH, 1 July 2002, 
ZIP (2002) p. 1763. 
80  See BGH, 3 March 2003, BGHZ 154, 185; BGH, 5 July 2004, RIW (2004) p. 1618 (con-
cerning a Delaware company); BGH, 14 March 2005, RIW (2005) p. 542; BGH, 19 September 
2005, DStR (2005) p. 1870 (concerning a company incorporated in Liechtenstein); BGH, 7 
May 2007, ZIP (2007) p. 1306. 
81  M.-P. Weller, ‘Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht in der neuesten BGH-
Rechtssprechung’, 23 IPrax (2003) p. 327; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 407; OLG Hamburg, 
30 March 2007, GmbHR (2007) p. 763 et seq. 
In Austria, although §§ 10 and 12 IPR Gesetz [Austrian Act on Private International Law] 
of 1978 apparently follow the real seat doctrine, the case law has abandoned this doctrine in 
relation to EU and EEA Member States. See ÖOGH, 15 July 1999, JZ (2000) p. 199 (in 
Centros, the ECJ followed incorporation theory and the Austrian rule on choice of law could no 
longer be applied to companies incorporated in the European Union). 
Similarly, the recent project to reform German conflict law, which has not yet been ap-
proved by the German Parliament, aims at adopting incorporation theory. See RIW (2006) 
annex 1. 
82  According to Art. 1837 Code civil [French Civil Code] and Art. L 210-3 Code de com-
merce [French Commercial Code], French law must be applied if the ‘siege social’ of a 
company, which generally refers to the administrative seat, is located in France. Y. Loussouarn, 
P. Bourel and P. de Vareilles-Sommières, Droit international privé (Paris, Dalloz 2004) 
comment 707. 
83  See M. Menjucq, La mobilité des sociétés dans l’espace européen (Paris, L.G.D.J. 1997) 
p. 132 et seq.; P. Mayer and V. Heuzé, Droit international privé, 8th edn. (Paris, Montchrestien 
2004) comment 1037. These scholars hold that according to French case law the connecting 
factor is the registered office not the real seat. 
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administrative seat together with the registered office and follow the regular 
national incorporation proceedings in order to become a French company.84 
 
4.1.3.2 The country of arrival follows incorporation theory 
 
If the country of arrival follows incorporation theory and a company only 
transfers its administrative seat, leaving its registered office in the original 
country, the conflict law of the country of arrival refers back to the law of the 
country of departure. If the latter accepts this renvoi, then the company will be 
still regulated by the law of the original country, despite the transfer of the 
administrative seat.85 It is worth noting that, if this happens, the coincidence of the 
registered office and the applicable law is not violated.86 
 If a company transfers its registered office to a country that follows incorpora-
tion theory, we should pay attention to the real connecting factor adopted by the 
country of arrival. For instance, under English conflict law, foreign companies 
cannot change the applicable law and reincorporate under English company law, 
since the connecting factor is the domicile of origin.87 In contrast, other countries 
following incorporation theory, allow ‘inbound’ reincorporation without liquida-
tion. For instance, Swiss law explicitly allows foreign companies to submit 
themselves to Swiss company law without being liquidated and reincorporated, 
provided that the original jurisdiction allows this.88 Italian conflict law also does 
not place obstacles in front of the inbound transfer of the administrative seat or 
the registered office, provided that the country of origin, whose law must be 
applied in accordance with Italian conflict rules, refers back to Italian substantive 
law. In addition, Italian law provides a typical norm against pseudo-foreign 
corporations, according to which Italian substantive law applies to companies 
incorporated abroad that have either their administrative seat or the main centre of 
their activities in Italy.89 
—————————————————— 
84  Loussouarn, Bourel and Vareilles-Sommières, supra n. 82, comment 709. 
85  This is true only if the conflict rules of the home country refer to both conflict and sub-
stantive law (renvoi). If the conflict law only calls for the application of substantive law, the 
company should be governed by the law of the country of arrival, notwithstanding that the 
conflict law of the latter refers to another law. This should lead to a disagreement between the 
country of departure and the country of arrival as regards the applicable law. 
86  Knobbe-Keuk, supra n. 15, at p. 350; Kieninger, supra n. 37, at p. 694; Menjucq, supra 
n. 83, at p. 142; Garcimartìn Alférez, supra n. 15, at p. 110; Roth, supra n. 58, at p. 382 and 
Roth (2005), supra n. 15, at p. 979; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 501. But see also Großfeld, 
supra n. 16, comment 629 (who holds that German law should consider the company as having 
been wound up even when the applicable company law does not change). 
87  Smart, supra n. 16, at p. 356; Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra n. 50, at p. 1337. 
88  Art. 161(1) of the Swiss Code on Private International Law. 
89  It is unclear to what extent Italian substantive law should be followed by pseudo-foreign 
companies, but this rule cannot be applied to companies incorporated in a Member State, 
according to EC freedom of establishment as interpreted by the ECJ. See Ballarino, supra n. 52, 
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4.2 Substantive law 
 
4.2.1 Company law of the country of departure 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, the question whether company law 
changes is determined by conflict law, and the change of the applicable substan-
tive law thus depends on whether the company transfers the connecting factor, 
according to both the country of departure and the country of arrival. 
 In contrast, substantive company law determines whether the transfer of the 
administrative seat and/or registered office is allowed.90 As I have pointed out 
above, some countries, such as Germany, regard the transfer abroad of the 
administrative seat and/or registered office as a reason for the liquidation of the 
company. Other countries, such as England, regard the transfer of the domicile as 
simply ineffective. In both cases, a company cannot effectively transfer the 
administrative seat or the registered office without being dissolved in the original 
jurisdiction and reincorporated in the new one. These solutions are independent 
from the connecting factors chosen by conflict law: even jurisdictions following 
incorporation theory could hinder company ‘emigration’ and jurisdictions 
following real seat theory could allow identity-preserving company law changes. 
This will be clarified by means of some examples: 
 
(a) Among countries following incorporation theory, we could take the example of 
English company law and Italian company law, which do not share the same view 
regarding the outbound transfer of the registered office.91 English companies cannot 
transfer their registered office to Scotland or any other EU Member State.92 If this 
happens, as we have already seen, a new company is regarded as having been 
incorporated in the country of arrival and the ‘old’ English company is regarded as 
still existent.93 Italian law is more liberal, because it permits limited liability 
companies to transfer their registered office abroad based on a decision of the 
general meeting, allowing dissenting shareholders to withdraw from the company,94 
although this transfer should not have consequences for the applicable law. 
—————————————————— 
at p. 127; F.M. Mucciarelli, ‘Libertà di stabilimento comunitaria e concorrenza tra ordinamenti 
societari’, 27 Giurisprudenza commerciale (2000) II, p. 574; Benedettelli, supra n. 68, at p. 
620; L. Enriques, ‘Delle Società costituite all’estero’, in Commentario del codice civile 
Scialoja-Branca (Bologna, Zanichelli 2007) p. 4. 
90  Knobbe-Keuk, supra n. 15, at p. 351. 
91  Both English and Italian law do not place any obstacles on the transfer abroad of the 
administrative seat of national companies, as this is not relevant under conflict law. 
92  P.L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2003) p. 117. 
93  Smart, supra n. 16, at p. 357. 
94  Art. 2437(1) Codice Civile [Civil Code] (as regarding the società per azioni) and Art. 
2473(1) Codice Civile (as regarding the società a responsabilità limitata). But see the decision 
of the Corte di Cassazione cited supra at n. 71. 
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(b) Among countries following real seat theory, we can mention German, French 
and Belgium company law. According to German case law, a company that 
transfers its actual administrative seat abroad should be regarded as having been 
wound up,95 and a decision of the general meeting to transfer the administrative 
seat and/or registered office abroad is also regarded as a winding-up decision.96 
According to other scholars, these decisions are simply void and the company 
should not be liquidated.97 Therefore, a German company can transfer abroad 
neither its administrative seat, nor its registered office, nor both together. French 
company law, in contrast, explicitly allows limited liability companies and 
sociétés en commandite simple to transfer their registered office abroad and 
change company law, but only if the shareholders decide unanimously in favour 
of such a move.98 
 
4.2.2 Company law of the country of arrival 
 
If the conflict law of the country of departure refers to the company law of the 
country of arrival and the conflict rules of the latter accept this, the transfer 
produces a change in the applicable company law.99 Nonetheless, the company 
law of the country of arrival could hinder the ‘immigration’ regardless of the con-
flict rules that are in force, for instance by requiring the company to reincorporate 
—————————————————— 
95  See Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 605 et seq.; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 507 (but 
only if the company seeks to transfer the administrative seat to a country applying the real seat 
doctrine). 
96  BayObLG, 7 May 1992, BayOBLGZ (1992) 113 et seq.; Großfeld, supra n. 16, comment 
631 et seq. See also BayObLG, 11 February 2004, AG (2004) p. 266 et seq.: a decision of the 
general meeting to transfer the registered office from Germany to Portugal cannot be registered. 
See M.-P. Weller, ‘Zur identitätswahrender Wegzug deutscher Gesellschaften’, 42 DStR (2004) 
p. 1218. 
97  M. Lutter and W. Bayer, in M. Lutter and P. Hommelhoff, eds., GmbHG (Cologne, Otto 
Schmidt 2004) § 4, comment 22; U. Hüffer, AktG, 7th edn. (Munich, Beck 2006) § 5, comment 
12; P. Kindler, ‘GmbH Reform und internationales Gesellschaftsrecht’, 52 Aktiengesellschaft 
(AG) (2007) p. 723. 
98  Art. L. 225-97 Code de commerce [French Commercial Code]. See H. Le Nabasque, 
‘L’incidence des normes européennes sur le droit français applicable aux fusions et au transfert 
de siège social’, Rev. Société (2005) p. 81 et seq. 
Another example may be provided by Belgian law, which also follows real seat theory. The 
transfer of the administrative seat is permitted, and the company is not liquidated, if both the 
country of departure and the country of arrival agree on this. See Art. 112 of the Code of 
Private International Law; and F. Rigaux and M. Fallon, Droit international privé (Brussels, 
Larcier 2005) p. 989. 
99  It is always worth paying attention to the substantive law of the country of arrival, be-
cause if the latter places obstacles in the way of a transfer, the company is in practice hindered 
in the transfer of the administrative seat or the registered office. See Knobbe-Keuk, supra n. 15, 
at p. 353. 
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in the country without preserving its legal personality. In that case, the original 
jurisdiction should also regard the company as having been liquidated. 
 
4.3 Conclusions 
 
We can sum up the previous sections by stating that identity-preserving company 
law changes depend on the combined application of the conflict and substantive 
rules of both the country of incorporation and the country of arrival. 
 From the viewpoint of the country of incorporation, we should distinguish 
between countries belonging to the ‘real seat’ family and countries belonging to 
the ‘incorporation’ family: 
 
(a) If the country of departure follows real seat theory, the applicable company 
law changes without liquidation if: (1) substantive company law allows compa-
nies to transfer the administrative seat (together with the registered office) and to 
reincorporate voluntarily in another country without being liquidated; (2) the 
company follows the relevant procedures and secures the necessary majorities; 
and (3) the country of arrival accepts the ‘inbound’ transformation. 
 
(b) If the country of departure follows incorporation theory, the applicable 
company law changes without liquidation if: (1) substantive company law allows 
companies to transfer the registered office and to reincorporate voluntarily in the 
country of arrival; (2) the company follows the relevant procedures and secures 
the necessary majorities; (3) the relevant conflict law does not only refer to the 
country of the original incorporation but also to the country where the company 
was reincorporated afterwards; and (4) the country of arrival accepts the ‘in-
bound’ transformation. 
 
 
5. EC FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND ‘MOVING OUT’ CASES 
 
5.1 Ambiguities of Articles 43 and 48 EC 
 
I will now once again address EC law, asking whether EC freedom of establish-
ment also covers ‘moving out’ cases. To answer this question, it is useful to 
briefly summarise the legal basis of EC freedom of establishment as provided by 
the Treaty and the ECJ’s decisions. 
 The difficulties faced by legal scholars and the ECJ in allowing the transfer of 
a company’s administrative seat or registered office throughout the European 
Union are due to the ambiguities of Articles 43 and 48 EC, which are not per-
spicuous with regard to legal entities. 
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 In this regard, it is worth recalling that Article 43 EC provides for two kinds of 
freedoms.100 The ‘primary’ freedom bans every restriction erected by a Member 
State on the establishment of its nationals in another Member State. Therefore, 
every citizen of a Member State can move his or her domicile or residence to 
another Member State, working and living there without being discriminated. The 
‘secondary freedom’ prohibits all restrictions on the establishment of branches or 
agencies in another Member State. Every citizen of an EU Member State can 
establish a secondary centre of interest for his or her activities in another Member 
State. 
 The same freedoms are granted to firms and companies, as stated in Articles 
43(1) and 48 EC. Indeed, according to the latter article,  
 
[c]ompanies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State 
and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be 
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member 
States. 
 
 It is not clear what this equal treatment of legal entities and human beings 
means in terms of EC freedom of establishment. This issue is highly debated 
because Article 43(1) EC is apparently written only for natural persons, who have 
the right to establish themselves in another Member State. Therefore, Member 
States cannot place limits on the immigration and establishment of citizens from 
other Member States nor on the emigration of their own citizens.101 For instance, a 
French citizen can live and work permanently in Italy without losing French 
nationality. EC freedom of establishment prohibits French law from obstructing 
the emigration of French citizens and requires Italian law not to discriminate 
against French citizens vis-à-vis Italian ones or to raise other obstacles to immi-
gration, unless they are aimed at achieving a public goal and are proportionate to 
this aim. It should be noted that EC freedom of establishment does not require 
—————————————————— 
100  See U. Forsthoff, ‘Mobilität von Gesellschaften im Binnenmarkt’, in H. Hirte and T. 
Bücker, eds., Grenzüberschreitende Gesellschaften (Cologne, Heymanns 2006) comment 11 et 
seq.; D. Wyatt and A. Dashwood, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2006) p. 841 et seq. 
101  It is widely recognised by legal scholars that Member State citizens enjoy EC freedom 
of establishment not only vis-à-vis countries of arrival but also vis-à-vis the country of 
emigration. See ECJ, Case C-251/98 Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst Par-
ticulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem [2000] ECR I-2787, 28: ‘Even though Article 52 of the 
Treaty, like the other provisions concerning freedom of establishment, is, according to its 
terms, aimed particularly at ensuring that foreign nationals are treated in the host Member State 
in the same way as nationals of that State, it also prohibits the Member State of origin from 
hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its own nationals.’ Among legal 
scholars, see Forsthoff, supra n. 100, comment 20; Ringe, supra n. 18, at p. 639. 
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Member States to grant a right to change an ‘old’ nationality into the one of the 
country of establishment, since citizenship rules are still within the competence of 
the Member States. 
 The application of EC freedom of establishment to companies is not clear, 
because legal entities do not exist and live per se, as human beings do, but only 
according to the law of a specific jurisdiction, which grants them legal personality 
and regulates their internal organisation and their relations with the outside world. 
This point was stressed by the ECJ in Daily Mail, where it stated that ‘companies 
are creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of 
national law’.102 Far from being a mere theoretical remark, this assumption was 
used by the ECJ to allow Member States to place limits on the emigration of 
domestic companies.103 This is confirmed in Überseering, where the ECJ stated 
that ‘Articles 43 EC and 48 EC require Member State[s] to recognise the legal 
capacity and, consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings which 
the company enjoys under the law of its State of incorporation’. 
 The question therefore arises whether Article 48 EC provides a hidden conflict 
rule referring to the country of incorporation. Indeed, after the decisions in 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, the debate among legal scholars focused 
mostly on conflict rules, rather than substantive rules, and particularly on whether 
real seat theory is still compatible with EC freedom of establishment. In the 
previous pages, I have stressed that not only conflict rules but also substantive 
rules can raise obstacles to company mobility. Thus, it would be too restrictive an 
approach to hold that EC freedom of establishment simply provides for a hidden 
norm on the choice of law that refers to the country of incorporation,104 as in this 
way we would address only some of the obstacles to company mobility but not all 
of them. Moreover, we should also consider that EC law is not placed at the same 
level as national jurisdictions and that it does not need to fit into legal categories 
and distinctions stemming from national laws and legal thinking. Therefore, we 
should argue that EC freedom of establishment prohibits whatever rule may 
obstruct company mobility in an unreasonable way.105 
—————————————————— 
102  Daily Mail, supra n. 2, recital 19. 
103  Ibid., at recital 25. 
104  S. Leible and J. Hoffmann, ‘“Überseering” und das (vermeintliche) Ende der Sitztheo-
rie’, 48 RIW (2002) p. 928; P. Behrens, ‘Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem 
Überseering-Urteil des EuGH und den Schlussanträgen zu Inspire Art’, 23 IPrax (2003) p. 204; 
C.C. Wendehorst, ‘Kollisionsnormen im Primären Europarecht’, in Festschrift Heldrich, supra 
n. 15, at p. 1083 et seq. 
105  See W.-H. Roth, ‘Der Einfluβ des europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das interna-
tionale Privatrecht’, 55 RabelsZ (1991) p. 631; Benedettelli, supra n. 68, at p. 576 et seq.; 
Wouters, supra n. 49, at p. 116; Eidenmüller and Rehm, supra n. 47, at p. 165; Rehm, supra n. 
42, comment 71; S. Leible, ‘Niederlassungsfreiheit und Sitzverlegungsrichtlinie’, 33 ZGR 
(2004) p. 534; Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 116. 
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 This conclusion allows us to tackle the question whether EC freedom of 
establishment covers identity-preserving company law changes. As I have pointed 
out in the previous sections, we should distinguish between two questions: (a) 
whether the company can transfer the administrative seat and/or registered office 
abroad without losing its legal identity; and (b) whether a transfer of the adminis-
trative seat and/or registered office changes the applicable company law. First, we 
will ask whether EC freedom of establishment requires Member States to allow 
national companies to transfer abroad their registered office and/or administrative 
seat without liquidation. As we have already seen, this question is answered by 
substantive company law at national level. Second, we will ask whether EC law 
requires Member States to allow national companies to change the applicable 
substantive law voluntarily. Whether and under what circumstances the applicable 
company law changes is a question answered at the national level by conflict 
rules, while substantive rules are meant to establish the procedure to approve such 
a decision. 
 
5.2 Company ‘migrations’ throughout the European Union 
 
5.2.1 Ambiguities of Daily Mail 
 
The first question was explicitly addressed by the ECJ only in relation to coun-
tries of arrival, which cannot place obstacles in the way of ‘inbound’ transfers of 
the administrative seat and/or registered office.106 
 In contrast, in Daily Mail, the ECJ judged the obstacles imposed by the country 
of departure as compatible with EC law, stating that Articles 43 and 48 EC  
 
confer no right on a company incorporated under the legislation of a Member 
State and having its registered office there to transfer its central management 
and control to another Member State, while retaining the status of companies 
incorporated under the legislation of the first Member State.107  
 
This was not explicitly overruled, as the ECJ distinguished Überseering and 
Inspire Art from Daily Mail,108 stressing that  
 
unlike the case before the national court in this instance, Daily Mail and Gen-
eral Trust did not concern the way in which one Member State treats a 
company which is validly incorporated in another Member State and which is 
exercising its freedom of establishment in the first Member State.109  
—————————————————— 
106  Überseering, supra n. 1. 
107  Daily Mail, supra n. 2, recital 24. 
108  Überseering, supra n. 1, recital 61 et seq.; Inspire Art, supra n. 1, recital 102 et seq. 
109  Überseering, supra n. 1, recital 66. 
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Therefore, we should consider Daily Mail as being still good law. 
 I have stressed above that Daily Mail does not address a case of winding up 
decided by the country of incorporation but the Treasury’s authorisation to the 
transfer abroad of the tax domicile. Therefore, most of what the ECJ declared in 
this decision should be regarded as obiter dictum.110 Moreover, Daily Mail is 
inherently contradictory, because in another place it also stresses that Articles 43 
and 48 EC ‘prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment 
in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated 
under its legislation which comes within the definition contained in Article 58’.111 
Thus, the ECJ stated that restrictions on company ‘emigrations’ imposed by the 
country of incorporation are covered by EC freedom of establishment. 
 As I have remarked above,112 this was not an isolated statement. On the 
contrary, it has been used as precedent in at least two other cases that I have 
already mentioned above, ICI (1998)113 and Marks & Spencer (2006),114 in which 
the ECJ stated that EC freedom of establishment also covers limits imposed by 
the country of incorporation. 
 We can conclude, therefore, that the ECJ’s case law is far from being uncon-
troversial as regards the distinction between the ‘moving in’ and ‘moving out’ of 
companies and that the question whether the country of incorporation can place 
limits on company ‘emigrations’ still needs to be answered. 
 
5.2.2 Lack of rationale for any distinction between ‘moving in’ and ‘moving 
out’ cases 
 
In this section, I will argue that to distinguish between ‘moving out’ and ‘moving 
in’ cases is not consistent with EC freedom of establishment. 
 We should proceed from the basic norm of Article 48 EC, which extends to 
legal entities the right to establish themselves in another Member State that 
Article 43 EC assigns to natural persons. Article 48 raises the question whether 
Member States can wind up companies that transfer their registered office and/or 
administrative seat abroad, ‘killing’ them at the frontier.115 
—————————————————— 
110  Behrens, supra n. 104, at p. 201; Rehm, supra n. 42, comment 57. 
111  Daily Mail, supra n. 2, recital 16; see W.-H. Roth, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht 
nach Überseering’, 23 IPrax (2003) p. 122; Roth (2003), supra n. 15, at p. 193; Roth (2005), 
supra n. 15, at p. 983. 
112  See supra para. 3.3. 
113  ICI, supra n. 44. 
114  Marks & Spencer, supra n. 14. 
115  If we do not consider legal persons as inherently identical to natural persons, we could 
refer EC freedom of establishment to the shareholders by putting the question in a different 
way: does freedom of establishment grant shareholders the right to transfer the administrative 
seat and/or registered office of their company to another Member State without needing to 
liquidate the company in the original country and incorporate a new company in a different 
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 The inherent diversity between natural and legal persons emerges if we 
consider that Member States can neither kill their citizens at the frontiers (which 
is obvious, at least in democratic countries) nor take away their legal capacity if 
they try to emigrate. In addition, Member States cannot take away the citizenship 
of somebody who is establishing him or herself in another Member State, this 
being an unacceptable restriction of EC freedom of establishment. 
 Taking Article 48 EC seriously, we should argue that Member States cannot 
do to companies what they are not allowed to do to individuals.116 and that they 
therefore cannot liquidate an emigrating company. 
 One could nonetheless agree with Daily Mail, stressing that, in contrast to 
human beings, legal persons are a mere creation of the law. If we continue from 
this premise, we might argue that it is within Member States’ competence to 
determine under what conditions a legal person can be created and continues to 
exist.117 and even to establish whether to offer natural persons the opportunity to 
form a company instead of carrying on business as individuals.118 If we admit this, 
we might also conclude that Member States are free to liquidate national compa-
nies that transfer their administrative seat and/or registered office abroad.119 
 This argument, after a deeper scrutiny, cannot be praised, as it is merely 
product of positivistic conceptions of the legal personality and their consequences 
are squarely in contrast with EC freedom of establishment. 
 Indeed, if the country of incorporation liquidates companies that transfer their 
administrative seat and/or registered office abroad, such companies would have 
only two alternatives: (a) give up their aim to ‘emigrate’; or (b) accept being 
wound up in the original country and reincorporated in the Member State of 
arrival. After liquidation, the ‘emigrating’ company no longer exists as a legal 
entity. We should then ask ourselves who is reincorporating in the country of 
arrival. The answer is easy: the former shareholders as individuals are incorporat-
ing a new company, not the ‘old’ company, which does not exist anymore. In 
other words, following the theory that countries of incorporation are free to 
liquidate emigrating companies, we would then implicitly assume that the share-
holders as individuals – not the company – enjoy EC freedom of establishment, 
—————————————————— 
Member State? See W. Schön, ‘The mobility of companies in Europe and the organizational 
freedom of company founders’, ECFR (2006) p. 138. 
116  Knobbe-Keuk, supra n. 15, at p. 354; H. Eidenmüller, ‘Mobilität und Restrukturierung 
von Unternehmen im Binnenmarkt’, 59 Juristenzeitung (JZ) (2004) p. 29; Eidenmüller and 
Rehm, supra n. 47, at p. 177; Rehm, supra n. 42, comment 63; Leible, supra n. 105, at p. 536; 
Wymeersch, supra n. 64, at p. 677; Ringe, supra n. 18, at p. 632. 
117  See Farnsworth, supra n. 63, at p. 230: ‘According to the common law both of England 
and America, the personality of a corporation – and this has been seen to be its status – depends 
solely on the law of the country of its incorporation which alone can bring it into existence or 
cause it to cease to exist.’ 
118  See Ringe, supra n. 18, at p. 631 (who then criticises this argument). 
119  See Kindler, supra n. 16, comment 98. 
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which is to say that Article 48 EC is meaningless.120 This outcome is a complete 
negation of EC freedom of establishment of legal persons, not a simple limitation 
of this freedom,121 and this conclusion is therefore not compatible with the EC 
Treaty. 
 It also follows from this conclusion that Article 48 EC, which states that legal 
persons ‘should be treated the same way as a natural person’, implicitly interferes 
with national substantive rules, since it prohibits Member States from liquidating 
a company that transfers abroad its administrative seat and/or registered office. 
Member States are free to establish the legal conditions for incorporating a new 
company under their law, but once the company has been created it is free to 
exercise EC freedom of establishment throughout the European Union just as 
individuals do. This outcome should not come as a surprise: the creation of a 
single market throughout the European Union means precisely that firms based in 
a Member State should have the opportunity, if they regard it as economically 
reasonable, to transfer their activities and their administrative seat to another 
Member State. 
 
5.2.3 Transfer of the registered office 
 
The issue is more complex when it comes to the transfer of the registered office if 
the company does not simply amend the articles of association but also removes 
itself from the public register of the country of incorporation and files for 
registration on the public register of the country of arrival. Such a transfer of the 
registered office has two possible outcomes: (a) the applicable company law 
changes to the law of the country of the new registered office and the ‘emigrating’ 
company reincorporates in the country of arrival; or (b) if the substantive law 
does not change despite the transfer, the applicable law becomes unenforceable 
precisely because the law of the country where the public register is located does 
not coincide with the applicable law.122 
—————————————————— 
120  Art. 48 EC would only have the role of giving legal entities the right to become share-
holders of newly incorporated legal entities. Under a traditional systematic analysis, it is worth 
mentioning that this argument is consistent with whatever theory of legal personality we select. 
Even if we think that legal personality only has a fictive nature, being a verbal means to 
understand a set of rules to be applied to shareholders, we should still reach the conclusion that 
EC freedom of establishment cannot admit Member States to liquidate emigrating companies, 
otherwise Art. 48 EC would be meaningless. See Schön, supra n. 115, at p. 138. 
121  See W.F. Ebke, ‘Überseering: “Die wahre Liberalität is Anerkennung”’, 58 JZ (2003) p. 
932; Ebke, supra n. 55, at p. 23; J. Rickford, ‘Current development in European law on 
restructuring of companies: An introduction’, EBLR (2004) p. 1246. 
122  See P. Behrens, ‘International Company Law in view of the Centros Decision of the 
ECJ’, 1 EBOR (2000) p. 143. This is exactly the solution stemming from Italian conflict law 
and followed by part of the Italian case law (see supra n. 67 et seq.). 
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 Nonetheless, there is no real reason, from the viewpoint of EC freedom of 
establishment, to distinguish between the transfer abroad of the administrative 
seat and the registered office. Even if we hold that EC freedom of establishment 
does not cover identity-preserving company law changes, it is not possible to 
infer from this premise that the transfer of the registered office falls outside of the 
area covered by EC freedom of establishment. We should consider, indeed, that 
the change of the applicable company law stems from the application of national 
conflict rules, which diverge in terms of the relevant connecting factor. There is 
no reason for a different treatment under EC law of the administrative seat and the 
registered office, since both might well be connecting factors for company law at 
national level. 
 This does not mean that Member States are not allowed to place limits on the 
transfer abroad of the registered office – on the contrary, they can – but, since this 
transfer is also covered by EC freedom of establishment, any limit eventually 
imposed by Member States should be justified and proportionate to the need to 
achieve a public goal. In the wording used by the ECJ in Inspire Art,  
 
according to the Court’s case law, national measures liable to hinder or make 
less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
must, if they are to be justified, fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements 
in the public interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective which they pursue, and they must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it.123 
 
 The question arises whether and to what extent the winding-up of the emigrat-
ing company is necessary or proportionate to achieving a legitimate public goal. 
The same issue is raised, among others, by English and Irish law, which does not 
liquidate the emigrating company but regards the transfer abroad of the original 
domicile as ineffective.124 Both rules provide limits on EC freedom of establish-
ment that need to be justified under the proportionality review. The answer to the 
question whether restrictions are justified under the proportionality review should 
be provided on a case-by-case basis. 
 However, Member States cannot justify a winding-up of the emigrating 
company based on the aim of preserving the coincidence of the registered office 
and the applicable law, since in the country of departure has at its disposal a less 
—————————————————— 
123  See Inspire Art, supra n. 1, recital 133; see also ECJ, Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR 
I-1663, recital 32; ECJ, Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli 
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, recital 37; Centros, supra n. 1, recital 34; 
ECJ, Case C-436/00 X and Y v. Risskatteverket [2002] ECR I-10829, recital 43. 
124  Roth (2003), supra n. 15, at p. 197; see also M. Garcia-Riestra, ‘The transfer of seat of 
the European Company v. free establishment case law’, 15 EBLR (2004) p. 1318; Wymeersch, 
supra n. 64, at p. 692. 
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restrictive measure than liquidating the emigrating company order to achieve this 
goal: it can indeed allow the emigrating company to change company law while 
preserving its legal identity, since in this way the registered office and the 
applicable law would continue to coincide.125 
 Restrictions on identity-preserving company law changes need a different 
justification, such as the need to protect minority shareholders or company 
creditors in specific circumstances. But this aim is also not always able to justify 
the liquidation of the company. As I pointed out above, identity-preserving 
company law changes, from the viewpoint of the interests affected by such 
decisions, are similar to the conversion of the original company into another type 
of company regulated by the law of the country of arrival. The country of 
incorporation could therefore take into account the interests of minority share-
holders or creditors simply by extending to identity-preserving company law 
changes the national rules on company conversions, unless there are specific 
reasons that lead to the conclusion that these interests are not adequately protected 
by applying national rules on conversion. Once again, this should be established 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 The issue of employee protection is more complex, especially when the 
country of incorporation confers rights or powers on employees that are not based 
on labour law but on company law, as in the case of German codetermination.126 
In that case, identity-preserving company law changes would negatively affect 
employee interests in such countries. Hence, the SE Regulation and the Directive 
on Cross-Border Mergers deal with this issue and contain rules aimed at prevent-
ing firms from trying to evade the codetermination regime.127 But again, this is not 
a good reason to exclude the ‘outbound’ transfer of the registered office from the 
area covered by EC freedom of establishment. Instead, it could be a reason to 
accept procedural or substantive limitations imposed by the country of incorpora-
tion, similar to the provision of the SE Regulation and the Directive on Cross-
Border Mergers, aimed at allowing company ‘emigrations’ only if the country of 
arrival provides for the same level of employee participation as the country of the 
original incorporation.128 
 
 
—————————————————— 
125  Roth, supra n. 58, at p. 395. This is fully compatible with the wording used by the ECJ 
in Daily Mail. According to Daily Mail, if a company wants to preserve its legal identity, it 
should either leave the administrative seat in the original country or transfer it together with the 
registered office. See Frowein, supra n. 6, at p. 130 et seq.; Roth, supra n. 111, at p. 122; 
Behrens, supra n. 104, at p. 205. 
126  Gelter, supra n. 9, at p. 277; Johnston, supra n. 38, at p. 92 et seq. 
127  Johnston, supra n. 38, at p. 106 et seq. 
128  See Art. 16 of the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS: IDENTITY-PRESERVING COMPANY LAW CHANGES IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION? 
 
In the previous pages, I have tackled the issues related to the transfer abroad of a 
company’s administrative seat and/or registered office and identity-preserving 
company law changes, under both national and EC law. In this regard, it is useful 
to distinguish between the different ‘families’ of conflict rules. 
 
(a) The country of incorporation follows real seat theory. From a conflict law 
viewpoint, the real seat theory leads to a change of the applicable company law if 
the company transfers its administrative seat to another country. As a conse-
quence of this rule on the applicable law, real seat countries generally require that 
the registered office should coincide with the administrative seat. Therefore, at 
least theoretically, companies transferring both their registered office and their 
administrative seat abroad should change the applicable company law. Nonethe-
less, the substantive law of some jurisdictions, such as Germany, does not allow a 
change of company law, even if the company transfers both its registered office 
and its administrative seat. 
 
(b) The country of incorporation follows incorporation theory. I have distin-
guished between two kinds of incorporation theories, according to the connecting 
factor followed by the conflict rules. If conflict law refers to the country of the 
original incorporation (or ‘domicile’), the transfer abroad of the registered office 
is ineffective and a new company is regarded as having been incorporated in the 
country of arrival. Other countries call for the application of the law of any 
subsequent reincorporation, thus permitting identity-preserving company law 
changes. 
 
As regards EC law, I have argued that EC freedom of establishment, despite the 
common interpretation of Daily Mail, allows ‘outbound’ transfers of the adminis-
trative seat and/or registered office. This means that: (1) the theory according to 
which the country of incorporation is free to liquidate a company that transfers 
abroad the administrative seat and/or registered office is not compatible with EC 
freedom of establishment; and (2) Member States can place restrictions on the 
transfer abroad of the administrative seat and/or registered office, provided that 
these restrictions are aimed at achieving a legitimate public goal and are propor-
tionate to this goal according to the criteria established by the ECJ’s case law. 
 This outcome leaves open the question whether EC freedom of establishment 
also covers voluntary company law changes. In other words, the question arises 
whether Member States have a duty to provide their companies with a legal 
means to change company law voluntarily without needing to liquidate and 
reincorporate in the new country. The answer to this question should be in the 
negative, stressing the parallel between natural and legal persons drawn by Article 
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48 EC, which aims to extend to legal entities the same freedom of establishment 
that is granted to natural persons by Article 43 EC. Indeed, EC freedom of 
establishment does not grant natural persons who establish themselves in another 
country a right vis-à-vis the original country to change nationality. If we place the 
nationality of a natural person on the same footing as the lex societatis of a legal 
person, we should conclude that, pursuant to EC law, Member States do not have 
a duty to allow national companies to voluntarily change the applicable company 
law while preserving their legal identity.129 
 Despite this conclusion, I have argued in the previous pages that EC freedom 
of establishment also covers the transfer abroad of the registered office. There-
fore, the country of incorporation can neither liquidate the company that transfers 
the registered office abroad nor treat this transfer as ineffective, unless doing so is 
proportionate to achieving a legitimate public goal, which should be established 
on a case-by-case basis. The same rule applies even if the transfer abroad of the 
registered office leads to a company law change. 
 This conclusion paves the way to a high degree of legal uncertainty regarding 
the question whether restrictions to company ‘emigrations’ are justified under EC 
law.130 Companies risk not having knowledge in advance of the possible outcome 
of the transfer abroad of their administrative seat and/or registered office, unless 
the company and conflict laws of both the country of departure and the country of 
arrival explicitly admit identity-preserving company law changes.131 In order to do 
so, the conflict laws of both the country of departure and the country of arrival 
should adopt the same connecting factor and agree upon the change of the 
applicable company law; otherwise the company in question would be regarded 
as an ‘own’ company by both countries and would risk becoming a sort of 
‘hybrid’ company or a ‘chimera’ governed by two jurisdictions.132 Moreover, 
even if both countries allow identity-preserving company law changes and their 
connecting factors coincide, many technical problems arise if the regulations are 
not harmonised as regards the procedures and the timing of the transfer.133 This 
lack of harmonisation could be viewed as a sort of hidden obstacle in the path of 
outbound transfers, despite the fact that they are formally covered by EC freedom 
of establishment. 
 If identity-preserving company law changes are regarded as a relevant step on 
the path to efficient regulatory competition, it is necessary to clarify this issue 
through a directive, which, following the examples provided by the SE Regulation 
—————————————————— 
129  See Lombardo, supra n. 60, at p. 374. 
130  See E. Wymeersch, ‘Is a Directive on Corporate Mobility Needed?’, 8 EBOR (2007) p. 168. 
131  Legal uncertainty as such can be regarded as a relevant obstacle on the path to freedom 
of establishment. 
132  S. Rammeloo, ‘The Long and Winding Road Towards Freedom of Establishment for 
Legal Persons in Europe’, 10 Maastricht J. Europ. Comp. Law (2004) p. 195. 
133  Behrens, supra n. 122. 
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and the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, should take into account all interests 
affected by company mobility and harmonise the timing and procedures of the 
transfer of the registered office. 
